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Economic Theories of Organization: 
An overview and assessment of some recent developraents 
!• Introduction and structure of the paper 
Organization theory has the threefold task to explain the nature of 
organizations, their developraent and their functioni.ng at any particular 
point in time. To accomplish this task it draws upon insights frora a nurober 
of related disciplines, if and when appropriate. These disciplines include 
soeiology, psychology, politica! science, systems theory, and economics. As 
compared with the other disciplines, economics has contributed little to the 
development of present-day organization theory. This is surpri.si.ng in light of 
the fact that the entity to which organization theory has traditionally deyoted 
most attention, the firm, has an economie raison d'être. Jdoreoyer, econoraists 
have elaborated a "theory of the firm", Why then has economics not had a more 
profound impact on the deyelopment of organization theory? 
The next section suggests sorae answers to this question. It goes on to tndicate 
that some recent developraents in economie theory may be regarded as more proraising 
from the viewpoint of organization theory. These deyelopraents concern the 
research into aqency probleros and the elaboration of the orqanizational failures 
framework. The purpose of this essay is to present an oyeryiew and assessment 
of these developments. Section two will further specify this purpose. Section 
three deals with sorae antecedent literatures whereafter sections four and five 
deal with agency research and the organizational failures framework. Section 
six, finally, assesses the potential contrihutions of these literatures to 
organizational theory as they relate to its threefold task stated aboye. 
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2. Microeconomic theory and organizational reality 
Traditional microeconomic theory hardly deals with organizational problems. 
What has been developed as a "Theory of the Firm" can be characterized more 
appropriately as a theory of markets. In this theory the firm is no more than 
a single decision criterion, traditionally profit maximization. The theory of 
the firm examines the effects of applying this criterion in different market 
settings. The construct called "the firm" receives its information from the 
markets and adjusts its market behavior in accordance with the assumed decision 
criterion. By simultaneously examining the behavior of the various parties 
involved, the theory attempts to explain and predict the resulting market 
phenomena, such as supply, deraand, and prices. It is si 1 ent on the internal 
processes which have led to the firm's response to (changing) market conditions; 
it gives us no rationale for differences in organizational form or performance; 
indeed, it hardly explains why we have organizations at all (instead of just 
cooperating individuals). For all practical purposes, the firm is treated as 
a black box in the theory of the firm. 
Economists have long feit uncomfortable about this situation. At first, 
their uneasiness concerned the phenomenon of the firm, and, more specifically, 
the Corporation, itself. Adam Smith (1776, p. 700) expressed his feelings 
as follows: "The directors of such companies ... being the managers rather 
of other people's money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that 
they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the 
partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the 
stewards of a rich man, they are apt to' consider attention to smal! matters 
as not for their master's honor, and very easily give themselves a dispensation 
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frora baying it. Negli.gence. and profusion, therefore, jnust always preyail, 
more or less, in the .management of the affairs of such. a carapany." As we 
shall see later, this quote already highlights one of the ma in probleras 
dealt with in .later deyelopments, naraely the managerial incentiye problera. 
The spectacular growth of the corporate form forced later economists to 
accept the Corporation as a fact of economie life. In roatnstream uricroeconoraics 
little changed as a result of this recognition; the sarae basic raodel of the 
firm was assumed to be valid for these new forms of organization. Some 
economists, however, feit uneasy about this. They specifically questioned 
the retention of the profit raaxiraization hypothesis for the large entities 
which came to operate in raany fields of economie activity. The hypothesis was 
originally deriyed for individual behayior. It was retained for small economie 
units which could easily be identified with the individuais who owned them and 
who were, in fact, supposed to deterraine their behavior. Was this hypothesis 
stil! appropriate for the giant enterprises which were led by managers who 
owned little part, if any at all, of the company they managed? Could it be 
safely assumed that the objective of the firm would not be affected by its 
growth in si ze and the displacement of its owners by a separate group of 
managers? These questions spurred the development of "managerial models of 
the firm." Such models focus on the motivations of managers tn shaping the 
firm's decisions. For exaraple, growth of firm size replaced profits as the 
criterion variable in these models and/or satisficing instead of maximizing 
behayior was assumed to operate (see, e.g., Bauraol, 1959; Cyert and March, 
1963; Marris, 1964; Williamson, 1964.) 
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As far as microeconomics. is concerned, these deyelopments had relatively 
little impact. The raanagerial .models were not widely used (£yert and Hedrick, 
1972; Marris and Mueller, 1980). Even if they were used, the change amounted 
to little el se than changing the objective function of the black box cal led 
"the firm" to determine whether aggregate market phenoraena could be better 
explained and predicted. These models did not increase the microeconomists' 
attention for the interna! functioning of the firm. On the contrary, many of 
them subscribed to the methodological position which implied that the actual 
decision-making processes in the firm were irrelevant as long as the aggregate 
predictions were satisfactorily accurate (cf. Friedman, 1953). To thera it 
was not important whether the theory of the firm was empirically valid for 
the indiyidual firm, it was sufficiënt that the firm would behave "as if" 
the model were valid as judged by its predictive ability with respect to 
aggregate phenomena. 
These differences in methodology and leve! of analysis explain the wide 
gap existing between the microeconomic theory of the firm and organization 
theory. The latter is much more concerned with empirically valid knowledge 
about the individual organization like the firm. It does not draw heavily 
on analytical insights from economie theory. In fact, in roost countries it 
came into being not as an offspring of economie theory but as a reflection 
upon actual practice. It stil! is rather strongly practice-oriented and, if 
it is to be regarded as scientific, it assumes the characteristics of an 
applied science. Moreover, it is not a monodisciplinary application of any 
science but it draws eclectically on a number of disciplines such as sociology, 
psychology, politica! science, and economics. The managerial models of the 
firm have influenced organization theory but not to a significant extent as 
can be judged from the present-day textbooks. These models have had more 
irapact on areas wtrich. are jnore strongly hased on economics such. as finance 
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and, recently, accounting. But even there their tnfluence has not been 
pervasive. 
The wide gap between microeconomics and organization theory is a 
rather strange and, in my view, unfortunate phenomenon. For even if we 
accept that the former is concerned with. aggregate phenomena, I see no 
a priori reason why its building blocks shouldn't consist of erapirically 
valid models of individual economie units. And even if we grant that an 
aggregate approach has to ahstract from all the empirical richness at the 
individual level, shouldn't it at least come up with a description of 
individual behavior which is recognizable at that level as containing the 
most important factors? Methodologically speaking, it is hard to swallow 
that an empirical science shields its basic assumptions by an "as if" 
justification. The use of this device prevents a falsification of this 
element of the theory and, what is more, immunizes it for critique aitpgether 
(cf. Schreuder, 1983). Therefore, from the point of view of microeconomic 
theory a strong case seems to exist for narrowing the gap with organization 
theory as much as possible (Leibenstein, 1979). Similarly, organization 
theory can benefit from the increased attention of economists for intra-firm 
phenomena insofar as it might draw upon the economie concepts developed. 
As before, the fiel ds of finance and accounting stand to gain most, however, 
as they are already partly based on economics and new developments can be 
incorporated more easily. 
Fortunately, a number of recent developments in economie theory hold a 
promise in this respect. Economists have, for instance, become much more 
interested in the rol e of information in decision-making. The traditional 
assumption of perfect information is relaxed and the consequences of, e.g., 
costly, unequal or even unobtainable information are examined. In some 
approaches this is combined with the insights of the Carnegie School concerning 
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the computational limits of human decision-making (March and Simon, 1958; 
Cyert and March, 1963). At the sarae time research i.nto decistonnraaking in 
raulti-person settings is starting to be applied to a firra's decisions. 
These and other developments might provide the basis for greater contributions 
from raicroeconomics to an understanding of (.business) organizations. 
The purpose of this essay is to survey some of the emerging types of 
economie theories which seem particularly relevant in this respect: agency 
theories and the organizational failures framework. Specifically, I shall 
try to show which kinds of issues these theories attempt to deal with and 
to what kind of organizational problems they might therefore be applied. 
The emphasis thus is more on the proper assessment of the potential mnt.rihiit.-inn 
of these theories to our understanding of organizational problems than on 
their current status. The assessment will consequently focus on the 
conceptual rather than the merely technical formulation of these theories. 
Before reyiewing agency theories and the organizational failures framework 
I shall suramarize some antecedent literatures in the next section. First, 
Berle and Means1 thesis on the separation of ownership and control in modern 
corporations will be briefly presented, Their serainal work proyides an excellent 
statement of some of the main problems later economists have tried to deal 
with. Indeed, it can be argued that the Berle and Means thesis nas caused a 
separation of its own. It divided those who basically accepted their evidence 
and wished to explore its implications (the managerialists) from those who 
either didn't accept the evidence or argued that other mechanisms mitigated its 
consequences (the neoclassical economists). For both groups the Berle and 
Means thesis represented a major source of inspiration as indicated by the 
numerous references to their work up til! the present day (cf- Fama and 
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Jensen, 1983). Coase's early analysls of the nature of the firra (Coase, 1937) 
will be reviewed next. It has contributed some conceptual foundations to 
both of the theoretical approaches which forra the subject of this essay. 
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3. Some antecedent literatures 
3.1 Berle and Means on the separation of ownership from control 
In their classic "The Modern Corporation and Private Property" Berle and 
Means (1932) presented a wealth of empirical evidence on two forces at work in 
the modern Corporation: 
1. the centripetal force of economie power, and 
2. the centrifugal force of ownership. 
Regarding the first force, they showed that economie power, in terras of 
control over physical assets, tended more and more to concentrate in the hands 
of a few corporate managements. Large corporations grew faster than smaller 
ones on the basis of both assets and income. As a consequence, the wealth of 
large corporations increased at a very much more rapid rate than total national 
wealth. At the same time ownership in these corporations tended to become more 
dispersed. In many large corporations this trend had evolved to the point 
where the largest individual holdings represented only a very small percentage 
of total stock. In addition, new legal devices - such as the holding company, 
the voting trust and stock with unequal voting rights-were employed to 
effectively bring control of the Corporation in management's hands. As a 
consequence, the legal owners of the large corporation could no longer be 
considered in control of its decisions. Whereas formerly corporate ownership 
implied both control over its physical assets and the legal right to enjoy the 
fruits of their use, now in many cases control had passed into management's 
hands and the shareholders enjoyed only the latter right. 
The raain implication of this development was expressed by Berle and Means 
(1932, p 6) as follows: "The separation of ownership from control produces a 
condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate manager raay, and often do, 
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diverge, and where raany of the checks which forraerly operated to limit the use 
of power disappear." This gives rise to the following problems: 
1. the incentive problem: The traditional assumption was that "... if the 
individual is protected in the right both to use his property as he sees fit 
and to receive the full fruits of its use, his desire for personal gain, for 
profits, can be relied upon as an effective incentive to his efficiënt use of 
any industrial property he raay possess" (p 8). But what incentiye exists for 
those who control the decisions about the use of industrial property, but enjoy 
the fruits in only a very minor degree? * 
2. the power problem: the traditional justification of the use of economie 
power was similarly based on the protection of individual property rights. 
But what is the justification of the exercise of economie power by corporate 
managements who own hardly any part of the property of their corapany? If 
they are no longer controlled by the legal owners, how can they legitimize the 
power they wield? What is the philosophical justification of letting these 
individuals make corporate decisions with far-reaching consequences for the 
well-being of so many others? 
3. the external control problem: this problem is the logical consequence of 
the former two. In its siraplest forra it can be stated: Who controls those in 
control? If the external control of ownership has withered away, by what other 
mechanisms is it (to be) replaced? What other checks and balances exist - or 
shouid be devised - with respect to the economie power in corporate jnanagement's 
hands? And in whose interests shouid corporate decisions be made? 
2} 
These problems have been addressed in a wealth of further contributions. f 
Before examining some of these, however, Coase's serainal paper on the nature of 
the firm wil! be discussed in the next subsection, sinee it has provided 
conceptual foundations to the specific contributions to be surveyed in this paper. 
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3.2 Coase on the nature of the firm 
Images play a major role in determining the direction of research. The 
way we conceive of reality - i.e. the image we create of it - defines the set 
of interesting research questions and the acceptable ways of deal ing with 
3) them. ; In this sense Coase's (1937) seminal paper on the nature of the firm 
has provided a basis for both literatures to be surveyed here. 
Coase airaed at deyeloping a definition of the firm which was both realistic 
and tractable by the Marshallian instruments of economie analysis. Observing 
that economie theory assuraed that production is regulated by price movements 
and, hence, it could conceivably be carried out without any organization at all, 
he asked the fundamental questions: Why is there any organization? Why don't 
we only observe individuals whose activities are coordinated by the price 
mechanism? 
His answer was that there is a cost of using the price mechanism. First of 
all, the relevant price information has to be obtained. Next, there are costs 
of negotiating and concluding contracts for market transactions. And, finally, 
there may be circumstances in which longer term, relatively flexible contracts 
would be desirable. The firm, then, is explained by Coase as an institutional 
device to avoid costs of using the price mechanism and to enable certain forms 
of contracts not easily negotiable in atomistic markets comprised of only 
individuals. Specifically, contracts which only generally indicate the 
commodity or service to be supplied and which leave the buyer the opportunity to 
decide on the details later give rise to "a firm" according to Coase (1937, p 337). 
An example of such a contract is the eraployment contract. In this way, the firm 
and the market are presented as two alternative institutions for economie 
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coordination. The choice between the two is deterrained by the costs of 
organizing a given transaction under either arrangement. 
The agency literature, as applied to the firra, has primarily adopted the 
image of the firm as a "nexus of contracts" (Faraa, 1980). Agency research 
analytically examines the effects of certain contracts in different environments 
and empirically investigates the actual contracts of the firm and the way they 
determine its behavior. The organizational failures fraraework, on the other 
hand, has emphasized the institutional choice between the market and the firra as 
coordination raechanisms. lts priraary conceptual device is not a contract, but 
the transaction. It explains organizational forra by the economie properties of 
the transactions governed by a certain type of organization. 
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4. The agency üterature: an overview 
The agency üterature has quickly grown yoluminous in size, Accordingly 
only a broad brush sketch can be atterapted here. As indicated earüer, the 
task wil! be made manageable by focussing on the issues addressed by agency 
research and by discussing its potential contribution raainly in conceptual 
terms. Jensen (.1983) has obseryed that two types of agency üteratures have 
eyolved which differ in raany respects; the "principal-agent üterature" and 
the "positiye theory of agency. The forraer is generally matheraatical and 
analytical; the latter is raostly non-fliatheraatical and is more erapirtcally 
oriented. These two üteratures wil! be reyiewed separately below. 
4.1 The analytical agency üterature 
In Coase's (1937) seminal paper there is a footnote to his definition 
of the firm explaining that it is not possible to draw a hard and f ast üne 
which determines whether there is a firm or not. The problem, according to 
Coase, is similar to the lega! question of whether there is the relationship 
of raaster and servant or principal and agent. In 1972 he characterized his 
1937 paper as "much cited and üttle used" (Coase, 1972). However, by then 
the initial work had already started which would establish the analytical 
agency üterature which is also known as the "principal - agent" üterature. 
4) This initial work was largely done on the probleras of Insurance. ' 
(Arrow, 1970; Spence and Zeckhauser, 1971). Subsequently, the insurance 
example has corae to serye as a paradigm for studying employment contracts, 
optima! budgeting mechanisms, vertical integration, competition in the capital 
markets etc. The insurance paradigm highüghts two information problems 
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which may be encountered in these other settings as well: the "adverse 
selection" problera and the "raoral hazard" problera. Both wil! be illustrated 
below. 
4.1.1 Adverse selection and moral hazard 
Adverse selection is an ex ante inforraation problera. The essential 
cause is an inequality of inforraation between the two parties entering into 
a contract. In the insurance example one party is the insurer offering 
insurance contracts. The rates set in, for example, life insurance contracts 
may be initially based on actuarial calculations for sorae genera! population. 
The individuals seeking life insurance will, however, be rauch better informed 
about their specific risks and it may be irapossible or prohibitively costly 
for the insurer to obtain equal inforraation. High-risk individuals will, of 
course, have a greater incentive to buy life insurance than low-risk 
individuals. If it is impossible or very costly for the insurer to distinguish 
between high and low risks ex ante, he will end up insuring on average higher 
risks than anticipated on the basis of the actuarial tables. The insurance 
paradigra thus illustrates that the adverse selection problem concerns 
unanticipated risk as a consequence of unequal prior information. This 
problera may arise in many other contexts as well includi.ng, for example, 
employment contracts. 
The moral hazard problera concerns ex post inforraation. Consider the 
case of fire insurance. As Arrow (1974, pp 35-36) ovserves tt... the outhreak 
of a fire raay be due to a combination of exogenous circumstances and indiyidual 
choice, such as carelessness or, in the extreme case, arson. Hence, a fire 
insurance policy creates an incentive for an indiyidual to change his behayior 
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and ceases to be a pure insurance against an uncontrollable event." Moral 
hazard problems range from misrepresentation of private information (after 
the fact) to outright exploitation of contractual opportunities on the basis 
of private information. 
4.1.2 The 'conceptual formulation of agency problems 
An agency relationship is said to arise between two (or more) parties 
when one, designated as the agent, acts for or on beha!f of the other, 
designated the principal, in a particular domain of decision problems (Ross, 
1973, p. 134). Within the context of the firm, the principal might be the 
employer or superior and the agent might be the employee or subordinate. The 
agency research addresses the problem of how to write the contract between the 
principal and the agent so as to maximize their joint welfare. This problem 
becomes interesting in the face of uncertainty and of information asymmetry as 
discussed above and further illuminated below. 
Both parties are assumed to act in their best interests, i.e., to 
maximize their subjective utility. The utility of the agent is assumed to be 
affected positively by the fee he receives for the services rendered and 
negatively by the effort expended. The principal is assumed to strive for as 
high a monetary residual as possible after paying the contractual fee to the 
agent. The principal might, for instance, be conceived as the owner of assets 
and the agent as a manager hired to operate them. The agent would want to 
maximize the contractual fee for this service subject to the necessary effort 
levels. The principal would want to maximize the returns from the use of the 
assets subject to the fee payable to the agent (see, e.g., Baiman, 1982). 
Uncertainty is introduced in this setting by means of a state variable. 
This variable may represent any uncertain exogenous event such as the weather, 
-15-
machine breakdown, competitors' behavior etc. which affects the agent's 
productivity (Tiessen and Waterhouse, 1981, p. 21). The fee to be paid to 
the agent is assumed to depend on the actions chosen by the agent and on the 
state of nature which evolves. Hence, the level of the fee actually to be 
paid is only partially under the agent's control. This introduces risk to 
both the agent and the principal. In such a setting the agency problem is 
specified as the determination of a contract that wil! result in the optima! 
sharing of rewards and risks. The agent is mostly assumed to be risk-averse; 
the principal either risk-neutral or risk-averse. 
The problem is fürther complicated by the existence of imperfect information 
for one or both parties to the contract. It is assumed that the fee can be 
based only on what is jointly observable to the principal and the agent. 
However, it may be impossible or prohibitively costly to the principal to 
continuously monitor the agent in order to determine what action or effort level 
he chooses. In that case the fee cannot be based on the effort level. At one 
extreme, an alternative arrangement would be the payment of a fixed wage. 
However, this arrangement would provide no economie incentives to the 
agent to produce at the agreed effort level. At the other extreme, the principal 
might rent the assets to the agent. This arrangement would, however, impose 
a presumably nonoptimal amount of risk on a risk-averse agent. The agency problem 
again is to come up with an optimal sharing rule which would make the principal 
51 
and agent better off than in these extreme cases. ' This problem is multifaceted. 
It takes on different forms dependent on, e.g., the specific information considered 
(on the agent's effort and/or on the state of nature); its timing in the decision 
process (precontract, predecision, postdecision); the asymmetries allowed (moral 
hazard and/or adverse selection); the allowed set of feasible contracts-, the 
number of principals and agents; the number of time periods_etc_. Some of the 
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main contributions have been made by Christenson (1979); Demski and Feltham 
(1978); Gjesdal (1981, 1982); Harris and Raviv (1979); Harris and Townsend 
(1981); Holmstrom (1979,1982); Lambert (1981); Shavell (1979); and Wilson (1969), 
among others. It would transcend the scope of our survey to detail the particuiar 
contributions made. The general description offered above should suffice to 
highlight the problems defined by analytical agency research and the 
conceptual approaches taken to address them. 
4.2 The "positive" agency literature 
The "positive" agency literature to be surveyed here shares with the 
analytical literature the conceptualization of its research problems in terms 
of contracts. It is, however, much more concerned with describing and possibly 
explaining the contracts observed in the real world. It also examines the effects 
of those contracts on, e.g., the firm's behavior. It is based on a particuiar 
elaboration of Coase's image of the firm provided by Alchian and Demsetz (1972), 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama (1980). The contributions of these authors 
to the conceptual basis of "positive" agency research wil! first be discussed 
below, whereafter the research problems addressed in this literature will be 
examined. 
4.2.1 The concept of the firm 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972, p 783) elaborate a view of the firm which 
"... is not necessarily inconsistent with Coase's; we attempt to go further and 
identify refutable implications." Whereas Coase stressed the contractual basis 
of the employer's direction of resources, Adchian and Demsetz deny that such 
direction typifies the firm. Rather, the employer is continually involved in 
renegotiating the contracts on terms that must be acceptable to both parties. 
He is a spider in a web of contractual relationships which enable the firm to 
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execute team production. In team production the marginal products of the 
individual team members are not directly and separately observable. This leads 
Alchian and Demsetz to examine the efficiency properties of different monitoring 
and reward systems. The owner of the classical firm is identified as a 
specialist who wil! monitor the membership of the team (i.e. wil! manage the 
use of cooperative inputs) and wil! receive the residual rewards of production. 
Summing up, they identify the essence of the classical firm as "a contractual 
structure with (1) joint input production; (2) several input owners; (3) one 
party who is common to all the contracts of the joint inputs; (4) who has 
rights to renegotiate any input's contract independently of contracts with 
other input owners; (5) who hol ds the residual claim; and (6) who has the 
right to sell his central contractual residual status. The central agent is 
called the firm's owner and the employer" (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972, p 794). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) extended this analysis by focussing on the 
costs of the agency relationship. First of all, there are costs attached to 
the principal's monitoring of the agent's behavior or performance. As these 
costs diminish the total rewards to be divided between principal and agent, it 
may in some cases be in the agent's best interest to signal to the principal 
that he wil! not deviate too much from the behavior preferred by the principal. 
If the agent expends resources for this purpose, "bonding costs" are incurred. 
However, positive monitoring and bonding costs generally cannot guarantee 
that the agent wil! take only optima! decisions from the principal's point of 
view. Thus, there may be a "residual loss" defined as the monetary equivalent 
of the reduction in welfare experienced by the principal due to the divergente. 
Agency costs, then, are the sum of: 
(1) the monitoring expenditures by the principal, 
(2) the bonding expenditures by the agent, 
(3) the residual loss. 
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üensen and Meckling (1976) view this genera! framework as applicable to agency 
problems in all kinds of organizations and in all cooperative efforts. In 
their paper they confine their attention to the agency costs generated by the 
contractual arrangements between the owners and top management of the 
corporation. In later papers Oensen has collaborated with Fama to extend the 
scope of their analysis to other organizations. 
With respect to the theory of the firm Fama (1980) has argued that the 
former authors did not carry their analysis far enough. Particularly, the 
retention of the concept of "owners" of a firm (or of an entrepreneur in the 
classical sense) is an anachronism for the large modern corporation in which 
control is in the hands of managers who are more or less separate from the 
firm's security holders: "Instead, the two functions usually attributed to the 
entrepreneur, management and risk bearing, are treated as naturally separate 
factors within the set of contracts called a firm. The firm is disciplined by 
competition from other firms, which farces the evolution of devices for 
efficiently monitoring the performance of the entire team and of its individual 
members. In addition, individual participants in the firm, and in particular 
its managers, face both the discipline and opportunities provided by the markets 
for their services, both within and outside of the firm" (Fama, 1980, p 289). 
4.2.2. Research problems addressed 
The wider conceptual framework as proposed by Fama (1980) is reflected 
in the kind of problems addressed in this type of research. Researchers are 
not only interested in the contractual relationships but also in other forms of 
"disciplining mechanisms" which constrain an agent's opportunities to deviate 
from optima! behavior from the principaVs point of view. Generally speaking, 
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these other mechanisms are based on the operation of either markets or (other) 
information systems. For example, the manager's behavior is perceived to be 
constrained by a wide array of "disciplining mechanisms" including: 
contracts: executive emplo.yment and compensation contracts 
financial contracts (e.g. debt covenants, lease arrangements) 
markets: the market for goods and services (end products) 
the capita1 market (including the market for corporate control) 
the external labor market (the market for managerial services) 
the interna! labor market (competition among managers) 
information systems: interna! monitoring systems (e.g. the accounting 
system) 
external monitoring systems (e.g. financial analysts 
and the press). 
The executive employment and compensation contracts could be used to tie 
the managers' and shareholders' interests together. By giving the managers, e.g., 
bonus plans (based on earnings) or stock options their interests wil! parallel 
those of the shareholders more closely. The managers' incentives to divert funds 
to their private use, for example by indulging in perquisites, will be mitigated. 
As Jensen and Meckünq (1976) have explained, however, any departure from full 
ownership will induce such incentives to some extent. It may be that the other 
mechanisms take such tendencies into account. Jensen and Meckling's example 
concerns a full owner selling part of his shares in a company. The stock market 
will discount his increased incentive to divert funds to his private use in the 
new financing structure and will adjust the stock price accordingly. Hence, 
the owner bears the agency costs and has incentives to signal to the market 
that he will not be (over)spending privately. He can do so, for example, by 
entering into bonding arrangements like an auditing requirement. In many 
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respects, Jensen and Meckling's example constitutes an ideal case. The 
reasoning cannot be equally applied to the very large modern corporation whose 
managers own little or no equity, as Jensen and Meckling (1976, p 356) 
acknowledge. Although they speculate that their approach might yield insights for 
that case as well, I share Williamson's (1981, p. 1565) doubts about this. 
Financial contracts may constrain the manager's behavior in many ways. 
They may, for instance, specify minimum or maximum levels of certain ratios. 
Violation of these requirements would lead to (costly) renegotation of the 
contract. Similarly, the other mechanisms are perceived as constraining the 
manager's discretion. The hypothesized effect of managerial "misconduct" on 
share prices has already been mentioned. A low share price would make the 
firm a likely take-over target and this threat may therefore restrain managerial 
self-interested behavior. Furthermore, the interna! and externa! competition 
among managers could ensure the elimination of sub-standard practices. Interna! 
and external monitoring systems facilitate the effective operation of these 
other mechanisms. Some of these monitoring systems (such as the press, for 
instance) could claim a role of their own which goes beyond providing the 
necessary information for other disciplining mechanisms. 
To what extent these mechanisms operate in practice and their degree of 
effectiveness is, of course, an empirical issue. Unfortunately, although the 
"positive" agency literature purports to be empirically oriented (Jensen, 1983, 
p. 334) the amount of empirical research conducted in these areas is somewhat 
disappointing. Most studies remain at the conceptual leve! and fail to 
empirically test the hypotheses generated by theoretical analysis. Furthermore, 
a number of the studies which are sometimes cited as lending empirical support 
to the notions mentioned above have often been conducted independently of (and 
prior to) any research program on "positive" agency theories. Disregarding this 
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uncertain kinship, it must be further noted that relatively many studies 
just provide descriptive data on the factors which are thought to be operative 
without linking these factors to the managen'al behavior they are assumed to 
determine. Finally, the area is plagued by methodological problems and, 
possibly as a result, the findings are often highly contradictory (cf. Kelly, 
1983). An obvious difficulty is that management's behavior is probably 
motivated-and cohstrained- by many different factors, some of which may be 
largely situation-specific. The isolation of individual factors may therefore 
already be problematical, whilst the determination of their influence on . 
management's behavior will be even more complex. 
Empirical research into the effect of management employment and compensation 
contracts on managerial behavior is virtually non-existent. Some descriptive 
data on the forms of management contracts do exist (cf. Conference Board, 1979 
and 1980) but these data have not been empirically linked with behavior yet, as 
far as I know. Research has aimed at collecting similar descriptive data (e.g. 
Lewellen, 1971; Benston, 1981) and at most these have been linked with profits 
and share price performance of the corporations (e.g. Lewellen and Huntsman, 1979; 
Ciscel and Carroll, 1980). There are of course many intervening variables 
confounding these relationships; the direction of causality is questionable; 
and it is very difficult to separate the incentive effects of certain compensation 
schemes from their tax effects (see Smith and Watts, 1982). As a result we 
have not yet gained much insight into the empirical validity of the hypothesized 
effects of employment contracts on managerial behavior. 
Financial contracts may also constrain managerial discretion. Here the 
attention of empirical researchers has mostly focussed on the terms of debt 
covenants. Smith and Warner (1979) and Leftwich (1983) gathered descriptive 
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data on such provisions. They also attempted to theoretically rationalize the 
specific contractual forms they encountered, proceeding from the assumption 
that the persistence of these forms indicates their efficiency. Kalay (1982) 
relates the charaeteristics of his sample of bond indentures to the stockholder-
bondhol der conflict. Sinee stockholders are assumed to make the dividend 
payout decision, management's role in this conflict remains somewhat nebulous. 
Kelly (1983) reviews the literature on corporate management's role in external 
financial reporting. Bond covenants constitute one of the categories of factors 
hypothesized to determine management's accounting choices. Within this cateqory, 
the deqree of leverage is included as a surrogate for the existence of bond 
covenants upon the assumption that more highly levered firms are riskier and 
may, therefore, be more constrained by bondholders. Whether this assumption 
empirically hol ds is hardly examined by the studies reviewed. Leverage (and risk) 
may, for instance, directly influence managerial choice. In addition, leverage 
may surrogate for other factors and/or be highly correlated with them. Since 
larger firms are often more highly levered, leverage may e.g. surrogate for 
firm size. It is, therefore, not very clear that leverage is legitimately 
included in the bond covenant category. Direct measures of the existence and 
tightness of bond covenants feature seldomly in these studies and, where they 
do, produced mixed results. We are again left to conclude that the empirical 
relationships between (financial ) contracts and managerial behavior remain 
largely unexplored. 
Since agency research explicitly adopts the "nexus of contracts" perspective 
the paucity of empirical fcnowledge concerning the contractual determinants of 
managerial choices is disturbing. AUhough it is cleariy beyond the scope of this 
essay to survey the empirical evidence on the other "disciplining mechanisms" 
which are hypothesized to operate, it may safely be noted that the situation 
often is comparable. The explanation of mergers and take-overs, for instance, 
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remains one of the unsolved puzzles of finance theory (Brealey and foyers, 1981). 
There is hardiy any evidence on the disciplining effect of the managerial labor 
market, probably because of the multi-period formulation of these hypotheses. 
And the effects of internal and external monitoring systems on managerial dis-
cretion have only just begun to be investigated. Maybe the embryonic nature of 
our empirical knowledge concerning agency relationships is due to the early 
stage of development of this perspective. Nevertheless, it remains worrisome 
that the early studies in a research program that aims to be empirically oriented, 
have tended to neglect the demonstration of the empirical validity of its 
hypotheses. Whether in the future the balance wil! shift from conceptual 
analysis and the collection of descriptive data to the demonstration of the 
effect of the various disciplining mechanisms upon managerial behavior remains 
to be seen. 
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5. The Organizational Failures Framework 
The organizational failures framework has been elaborated in a number of 
publications (co-)authored by Oliver Williamson. Williamson graduated from 
Carnegie-Mellon University in 1963 and he has credited Richard Cyert and Herbert 
Simon for stimulating his interest in the firm as an object of analysis 
(Williamson, 1970, p. ix). His first major publications (1967, 1970) were 
indeed concerned with the theory of the firm and attempted to formulate 
"managerial" alternatives to the traditional model. In Williamson (1970) 
particular attention was given to the effects of organizational form upon 
enterprise behavior, apparently influenced by Chandler's (1966) work on Strategy 
and Structure. In later years the perspective was broadened to a comparative 
institutional analysis of the firm and the market as governance structures for 
the execution of economie transactions. It is this perspective which Williamson 
(1975) labelled the organizational failures framework. This label refers to 
the general idea underlying this framework namely that one mode of organizing 
transactions wil! give way to another when certain (human and environmental) 
factors work together to undermine its efficiency properties. The framework 
wil! first be described in its general form below, whereafter its application 
to the modern corporation will be discussed. 
5.1 The general formulation of the framework 
Following Coase (1937) and Commons (1934) Williamson (1975) adopts the 
transaction as the basic unit of analysis. His objective is to explain the 
institutional mechanisms which will arise to govern a related set of transactions. 
The main forms of such mechanisms are markets and organizations (or hierarchies). 
The organizational failures framework (OFF) attempts to identify and link the 
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various factors involved in determining the choice between these two mechanisms. 
These factors are sought in (1) the characteristics of human decision makers and 
(2) the properties of the environment. 
For expositional convenience it is assumed that "in the beginning there were 
markets" (Williamson, 1975, p. 20). Thus, the question is addressed why we 
observe organizations at all. Why are not all economie transactions mediated 
through the market? The answer is that certain human and environmental factors 
may impede the successful completion of particular types of transactions via 
markets. The joint operation of such factors may thus give rise to a "market 
failure." In such cases the transaction may well be more efficiently carried 
out in an organization. Organizations, however, may give rise to inefficiencies 
of their own: in principle, the same set of factors apply. Hence, only a 
comparative institutional analysis of market failures and organizational failures 
wil! enable us to predict which mechanism wil! be most efficiënt in what cir-
cumstances. 
The human factors involved are bounded rationality and opportunism, while 
the environmental factors are uncertainty and smal! numbers exchange. The 
first three factors together give rise to a derivative condition termed "infor-
mation impactedness." These factors wil! be elaborated upon below. Bounded 
rationality is used in the sense defined by Simon (1957, p. 198): "The capacity 
of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very smal! 
compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively 
rationa! behavior in the real world." As a consequence, human behavior is 
"... intendedly rationa!, but only limitedly so" (Simon, 1961, p. xxiv). It 
is already evident from these descriptions that bounded rationality is only 
interesting in complex situations: only then are the limits of rationality 
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reached. If environmental complexity or uncertainty is high, it may be very 
costly or simply infeasible to specify a complete contract which would enable 
a market transaction. ' When the market "fails" in this way, the costs (in-
efficiencies) of internal organization may be less than the costs (inefficiencies) -
of market organization and the transaction wil! shift from one domain to the 
other. 
Opportunism is introduced by Williamson (1975, p. 26) as extending "... the 
conventional assumption that economie agents are guided by considerations of 
self-interest to make allowance for strategie behavior." The term is intended 
to cover both "moral hazard" and "adverse selection" phenomena and to apply 
generally to a wide set of human behaviors involving (1) selected or distorted 
information disclosure and (2) self-disbelieved promises regarding future conduct. 
Generally speaking, the term therefore refers to a lack of candor or honesty 
in transactions. It is not assumed that all economie agents necessarily behave 
this way. The crucial assumption is that some agents behave opportunistically 
and that it is costly to sort out those who do from those who don't (Williamson 
and Ouchi, 1981). Given the possibility of opportunistic behavior, it is much 
more difficult to spell out an adequate contract for market transactions. 
The terms must be specified in a much more detailed fashion and great effort 
must be expended in anticipating contingencies. By itself, however, opportun-
istic behavior need not impede successful contracting. If large numbers of 
potential contractors compete, the opportunistic winner of the contract will 
pay for his behavior at the contract renewal date by losing the contract. If, 
however, a smal! numbers condition prevails, the trading situation is very 
different. In the extreme case of only two parties involved in an exchange 
the trading situation assumes the characteristics of a bilateral monopoly with 
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its associated uncertain outcome. Of special interest in the OFF is the sit-
uation where a large numbers condition prevails at the outset, but is trans-
formed to a smal! numbers condition during the execution of the initial con-
tract. This possibility will be elaborated upon further below. 
In Figure 1 the discussion above is summarized in the coupling of the factors 
bounded rationality - complexity/uncertainty and opportunism - smal! numbers 
exchange. In Williamson (1975, p. 31) "information impactedness" is discussed as 
"a derivative condition that arises mainly because of uncertainty and opportunism, 
though bounded rationality is involved as well. It exists when true underlying 
eircumstances relevant to the transaction .... are known to one or more parties 
but cannot be costlessly discerned by or displayed for others." Williamson 
submits that such information problems already exist when buyer and seller 
have identical information but (a) one agent makes representations that the true 
state of the world is different than both parties know it to be and (b) it is 
costly for an outside arbiter to determine what the true state of the world is. 
Such problems increase as information is distributed more asymmetrically; as the 
information is more incomplete; and as actors behave more opportunistically. 
In later expositions of the OFF this derivative factor of "information impacted-
ness" is scarcely mentioned, presumably because it does not seem to add much to 
the basie factors introduced earlier. 
Figure 1. The organizational failures framework 
Human factors Environmental factors 
Bounded Uncertainty/ 
rationality Complexity 
Opportunism < > Small numbers 
From: Williamson and Ouchi (1981) 
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Another factor mentioned in the original formulation of the OFF is "at-
mosphere." It was seen as a genera! condition describing the institutional 
setting of the transaction. More specifically, it referred to the attitudes 
of the economie agents toward the institutional setting of the transaction: 
"The Standard economie model misses such considerations 
because it assumes that individuals regard transactions in a strictly neutral, 
instrumental manner. However, it may be more accurate, and sometimes even 
essential, to regard the exchange process itself as an object of value. Con-
cern for atmosphere tends to raise such systems issues; supplying a satisfying 
exchange relation is made part of the economie problem, broadly construed .... 
Thus, modes of organization or practices which would have superior productivity 
consequences if implemented within, and thus would be adopted by, a group of 
expected pecuniary gain maximizers, may be modified or rejected by groups with 
different values .... which is to say that efficiency and a sense of well-being 
(that includes, but transcends, equity) are intrinsically joined" (Williamson, 
1975, pp. 38-39). This aspect of the original OFF formulation has been pre-
.sented here with such a lengthy quote, because it points toward a factor which 
has received increasing attention in organization theory. It is, therefore, 
somewhat surprising that this factor is subsequently neglected in further ex-
positions of the OFF, even in the essay directed primarily toward organizational 
theorists (Williamson and Ouchi, 1981). ' If preferences for atmosphere exist, 
and if such preferences influence the behavlor of individuals (e.g., by deter-
mining their choice of organization; by constraining their opportunistic inclina-
tions or by affecting their trade-off between material gains and nonmonetary 
satisfactions), it seems an important organizational design issue how such 
preferences can be accomodated. 
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The OFF discussed above describes the main factors which will jointly op-
erate to determine the governance structure of transactions. It does not yet 
teil us which institutions are available as potential governance structures nor 
what kinds of transactions will be mediated through which types of institutions. 
In Williamson (1975) the governance structures are identified as markets, peer 
groups and hierarchies. Peer groups involve "collective and usually cooperative 
activity, provide for some type of other-than-marginal productivity and income-
sharing arrangement, but do not entail subordination" (pp. 41-42). When the 
limitations of peer groups become too restrictive, simple hierarchies are 
adopted, which do involve subordination. Ouchi (1979, 1980) lists the available 
governance structures as markets, bureaucracies and clans. According to his 
sociological analysis these three mechanisms are arranged in order of an increas-
ing number of social requirements. All control mechanisms require reciprocity; 
the individuals involved must regard the transaction as equitable. Bureaucracies 
in addition, require a norm of legitimate authority. Clans require both these 
norms as wel! as a set of common values and beliefs among their members. The 
three mechanisms differ also in their information systems: in market organ-
ization the information requirements are primarily satisfied via the price 
system; in bureaucracies via the rule book and in clans through traditions. 
Which transactions will be mediated through what mechanisms? To answer 
this question we have to identify the main characteristics or dimensions of 
transactions which will make them particularly suitable or unsuitable for dif-
ferent governance structures. Williamson (1981) proposes three such dimensions: 
(1) the frequency with which transactions recur, (2) the uncertainty to which 
they are subject, and (3) the degree to which they are supported by durable, 
transaction-specific investments (see also Williamson, 1979). In his analysis 
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a considerable amount of explanatory power turns on the last dimension. Such 
asset specificity can arise in any of three ways: site specificity, physical 
asset specificity and human asset specificity. In each case a buyer and seller 
may become more closely tied together once an investment has been made. Con-
sider the human asset specificity which may result from investing in training 
personnel. Especially on-the-job training may produce such specific ski'lis 
that the employer and the employee are increasingly "locked into" the empioyment 
relation. At the extreme a bilateral exchange relation may obtain (cf. Williamson, 
et. al., 1976). Note that this is an example of the transformation of a large 
numbers exchange relation into a smal! numbers condition during the execution of 
the initial contract. Accordingly, where asset specificity is great, buyer and 
seller will make special efforts to design an exchange relation that has good 
continuity properties. As a result, recurrent autonomous contracting gives way 
to more complex forms of contracting and sometimes to internal organization 
(Williamson, 1981, pp. 1546-1547). 
The combination of the OFF with (1) the specification of the alternative 
governance structures and (2) the identification of the critica! dimensions of 
transactions completes the transactional perspective elaborated by Williamson. 
Although the linkages between these elements have not yet been fully spelled out, 
the OFF has been applied with reasonable success to such issues as the empioyment 
relation (Williamson et. al., 1975), franchise bidding (Williamson, 1976), 
vertical integration (Williamson, 1975), oligopoly (Williamson, 1975), aspects 
of inflation (Wachter and Williamson, 1978) and organizational design (Ouchi 
1979, 1980; Williamson and Ouchi, 1981; Williamson, 1981). The latter appli-
cation will be discussed in the next subsection. 
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5.2 The OFF and organizational design 
Consistent with the general thrust of the OFF-approach organizational design 
is addressed as a transaction cost issue. Thus, the traditional economie assumption 
that organizations economize on production costs is broadened to include trans-
action costs (Williamson, 1981, p. 1547). Related specifically to the two 
behavioral assumptions of the OFF the following compact statement of the problem 
of economie organization is suggested: "assess alternative governance structures 
in terms of their capacities to economize on bounded rationality while simul-
taneously safeguarding transactions against opportunism." According to Williamson 
(1981, p. 1546) this is not inconsistent with the imperative to maximize profits 
but it focusses attention somewhat differently. Although he doesn't explicitly 
state what constitutes the differences we may infer that they are (1) the design 
issues following from bounded rationality and (2) the strategie behavior problems 
associated with opportunism. 
The foregoing implies that efficiency considerations are assumed to gen-
erally determine the choice of organizational forms: "except when there are 
perversities associated with the funding process, or when strategically situated 
members of an organization are unable to participate in the prospective gains, 
unrealized efficiency opportunities always offer an incentive to reorganize" 
(Williamson and Ouchi, 1981, p. 355). To be sure, it is not argued that efficiency 
analysis will provide answers to all problems in organization theory. It is, 
however, maintained that efficiency considerations are crucial to the study of 
cqmmercial organizations and may be important to the study of other organi-
zational forms as well. 
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Williamson (1981) has advanced three propositions concerning organizational 
design. The first is the asset specificity principle: "the normal presumption 
that recurring transactions for techno!ogically separable goods and services 
wil! be efficiently mediated by autonomous market contracting is progressively 
weakened as asset specificity increases" (p. 1548). The principle is intended 
to apply to recurring transactions with an intermediate degree of uncertainty. 
For such transactions market contracting wil! be used as long as assets are non-
specific or semispecific. When assets take on a highly specific character, how-
ever, internal organization wil! displace market contracting. The basic reason 
is that contracting will become too costiy. Buyers and sellers wil! insist upon 
extensive contractual safeguards before undertaking a project involving highly 
specific assets which will "lock them into a transaction". Therefore, as 
specificity increases, so do the inefficiencies associated with contractual 
market arrangements. Bounded rationality will also impose a limit upon the 
contingencies to be covered in contracting. Moreover, internal organization 
offers a number of incentive and information advantages: (1) common ownership 
reduces the incentives of the trading units to pursue local goals, (2) internal 
organization may invoke fiat to resolve disputes whereas autonomous traders 
would have to resort to costiy adjudication, and (3) internal organization has 
easier and more complete access to the relevant information to settle disputes 
(Williamson, 1981, pp. 1548-1549). 
The second organizational design principle advanced is the externality 
principle. It applies mainly to the production-distribution interface and is 
concerned with potential quality debasement by distributors when it is difficuU 
for the producer to monitor their behavior. If a distributor's behavior affects 
not only his own performance but impacts also on other distributors" sales and 
the product's reputation in genera!, "demand externalities" are said to arise. 
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The externality principle then hol ds that "the normal presumption that exchange 
between producers of differentiated goods and distribution stages will be 
efficiently mediated by autonomous contracting is progressively weakened as 
demand externalities increase." If it is difficult for producers to insulate 
their products against quality debasement by distributors, market contracting 
will give way to organizational forms with superior quality control properties. 
The third proposition is the hierarchical decomposition principle. It 
states that "internal organization shouid be designed in such a way as to effect 
quasi-independence between the parts, the high frequency dynamics (operating 
activities) and low frequency dynamics (strategie planning) shouid be clearly 
distinguished, and incentives shouid be aligned within and between components so 
as to promote both local and global effectiveness." The principle recognizes 
the limits of bounded rationality which necessitate the division or problefns 
into manageable units. At the same time it attempts to prevent agents from 
engaging in opportunistic behavior, e.g., by pursuing local goals. 
It is recognized that these principies are not yet neatly embedded in a 
larger optimizing framework involving both production and transaction costs. 
In fact, the connection between the latter two principies and the genera! OFF 
seems rather loose. They seem to be more inspired by the work of Chandler 
(1966, 1977) than strictly deduced from the OFF foundations. Methodologically, 
it is therefore somewhat troublesome that Williamson (1981) uses Chandler's 
findings as examples to illustrate his organizational principies. This resembles 
a procedure of testing hypotheses upon the same sample from which they were 
derived. Nevertheless, it is instructive to see that Chandler's work may be 
-34-
interpreted from a transactions cost perspective. More empirical work on new 
data will, however, be necessary to demonstrate the validity of these organ-
izational principles. 
Ouchi (1979, 1980) has provided several noteworthy extensions of the 0FF-
approach. First of all, as noted above, he has added clans to the list of or-
ganizational forms available as governance structures for transactions. Next, 
he has provided an interpretation of the OFF from the sociological literature and 
from the perspective of organizational theory. Finally, and partly connected 
with the former, he has delved deeper into the alternative means of control in 
organizations. He has shown the close correspondence between (1) the modes of 
recruiting and monitoring people in organizations, (2) the form of their com-
mitment, i.e., by internalization, identification or compliance, and (3) the 
organizational form of control: markets, bureaucracies or clans. In addition, 
he has argued that the type of control exercised will depend on the ability to 
measure outputs and on the degree of knowledge available about the trans-
formation process,.i.e., the relationships between input and output. Clans, 
for example, will arise where not much is known about these relationships and 
where the ability to measure outputs is low. An example is the research lab-
oratory. In such circumstances the form of commitment relied upon is interna!-
ization of prevailing norms and identification with common goals. Control is 
not exercised in a very explicit way, since this would be infeasible and probably 
noxious to the employees. The close connection between these observations and 
Williamson's original reference to atmosphere will be clear. 
The empirical tests of the OFF have been conducted in other areas, such as 
franchise bidding (Williamson, 1976). In the field of organizational design 
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the empirical data brought to bear have largely been derived from prior studies 
which were reinterpreted from a transaction cost perspective. Although this may 
be valuable as a first step, certainly if the studies relied upon are as dis-
tinguished as Chandler's (1966, 1977), the proof of the pudding remains in in-
dependent testing of the generated hypotheses. As far as its application to 
organizational design is concerned, the OFF presently shares with "positive" 
agency research its empirical orientation in principle as well as its lack of 
independent empirical support in practice. 
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6. An assessment 
The purpose of this essay was to present an overview and assessment of some 
recent developments in economie theory from the perspective of their potential 
contribution to organizational theory. In the preceding sections the overviews 
of agency research and the organizational failures framework have been presented 
in conceptual terms and have focussed on the issues addressed in these liter-
atures. The assessment of their potential contribution to organizational theory 
will accordingly be carried out from the same perspective. As noted in the 
introduction, organizational theory has the threefold task of explaining the 
nature of organizations, their development, and their functioning at any par-
ticular point in time. The question to be examined below is to what extent 
agency research and the OFF may be expected to contribute toward the accomplish-
ment of this threefold task. 
First, a general characterization of the two literatures will be given pri-
marily by comparing them with one another. Then, their relationships with the 
tasks of organizational theory will be examined 
6.1 A general characterization 
As will have become apparent from Section 4 the agency literature consists 
of two very different parts. One is the "principal-agent" literature which is 
highly analytical and mathematica!; the other is the "positive" agency liter-
ature which is more empirically oriented, mostly non-mathematical, and rather 
descriptive. The two literatures do, however, share the same conceptual origins. 
Both conceive of their research problems in terms of contracts. The analytical 
agency literature attempts to specify optima! contracts for specific decision 
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problems; the "positive" strand is much more concerned with the contracts ob-
served in the real world and their impact upon the behavior of the parties in-
vol ved. Both may be characterized as predominantly employing a (comparative-) 
static analysis. In the analytical agency literature the decision situation is 
taken as given and the research problem is defined as specifying the optimal 
contract for the given situation. Similarly, in the positive literature the 
existing contracts are mostly taken as given and their incentive or disciplining 
effect on behavior is studied. To be sure, an external change (e.g., a regulatory 
change) may be introduced into the analysis and the effects of this change upon 
the contracts and/or the behavior may be studied. Such external stimuli may wel! 
be handled in a comparative-static approach. The internal dynamics of the 
problem, however, fall outside the scope of the analysis: what endogenous 
factors of the decision situation cause the set of contracts (and/or the behavior 
they elicit) to change over time? How do these endogenous factors interact 
with external factors to transform decision situations and modify behaviors? 
The OFF, on the other hand, adopts a comparative-institutional approach. 
Such an approach can, in principle, accomodate both a static analysis and a 
dynamic analysis. Indeed, the OFF employs both. It examines what type of 
transactions will be governed by which type of institution. But it also studies 
the possible transformation of a transaction from one type to another, giving 
rise to a change in governance structure. An example is the transformation of 
a trading situation from a large numbers to a smal! numbers condition, leading 
to increased asset specifity and hence to an increased competitive disadvantage 
of market contracting. Hence, the OFF-approach may be considered broader than 
the agency formulation of research problems. 
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As Jensen (1983, p. 334) has observed, the two agency literatures have 
developed rather independently. The "principal*agent" literature has employed 
a deductive approach to elaborate the analytical framework of contractual re-
lationships and induced behaviors. With a few notable exceptions (e.g., Demski 
and Feltham, 1978), this literature has remained devoid of real world impli-
cations. Indeed, most researchers have found it difficult to derive testable 
propositions from this literature, mainly as a result of the restrictive nature 
of its assumptions. Consequently, the analytical skeleton has remained without 
empirical flesh and blood. This undesirable situation ' could have been remedied 
if the "positive" strand of the agency literature had adopted an inductive 
approach. If it had proceeded from the same conceptual foundations it could 
have closed the gap between analytics and empirics from the latter si de. 
Two related factors have, however, inhibited this development. The first is 
that "positive" agency research has primarily focussed on further conceptual 
development at the expense of empirical work. The second is that this further 
conceptual development has led to the addition of many other kinds of "dis-
ciplining mechanisms" which are not accomodated in the analytical framework. 
As a result, the conceptual basis of positive agency research has broadened 
and has probably become empirically richer. At the same time, however, this 
development has widened the gap between both agency literatures instead of nar-
rowing it. In summary, the current status of agency research is rather far 
removed from the methodological ideal of the interplay of inductive and de-
ductive approaches, analytics and empirics. 
In comparison the OFF presents a much more consistent picture. The empirical 
work which has been done, corresponds closely to the analytical framework. 
However, as noted in section 5, as yet very little empirical research has been 
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conducted and most of it has consisted of reinterpretations of previous findings. 
Here, too, the challenge in the forthcoming years wil! be to correct the cur-
rent imbalance. 
6.2 The three tasks of organizational theory 
What conceptual relationships exist between these two economie theories 
of organization and the threefold task of organizational theory? This question 
wil! be examined below for each of the three aspects of the task, whereafter a 
general evaluation wil! follow. 
Nature_of the_ £r3amzat,ion^ 
The fundamental question here is: Why do we observe organizations at all? 
From an economics perspective the question is why not all transactions are car-
ried out through the market in "a single gigantic once-for-all forward 'higgle-
haggle'" (Meade, 1971, p. 166). Agency research sheds little light on these 
questions, as far as I can see. It takes a principal-agent relationship as 
given. Analytical agency research searches for the optimal contractual form of 
this relationship; "positive" agency research for the contractual and other 
determinants of the behavior of both actors. In general, neither explain why 
this relationship should necessarily be embedded in an organization rather than 
mediated through the market. The "nexus of contracts" view of organizations 
has thus generally failed to adequately distinguish between market and organ-
izational contracts. ' 
In contrast, the explanation of the existence of organizations represents 
the very core of the OFF. The explanation hinges upon bounded rationality and 
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opportunism. But for bounded rationa!ity, all economie exchange could be ef-
ficiently organized by contract (as elaborated in the Arrow-Debreu model). 
Given bounded rationality, however, incomplete contracting is the best that can 
be achieved in complex situations. Incomplete contracting is hazardous if the 
possibility of opportunistic behavior exists. Consequently, organizations may 
be the most efficiënt governance structure to economize on bounded rationality 
and to protect transactions against opportunism. As Williamson (1981b, p. 554) 
has observed: "... while organizational man is computationally less competent 
than economie man, he is motivationally more complex." Organizations are con-
ceptualized as efficiënt mechanisms for dealing with both factors for the types 
of transactions where incomplete contracting would pose opportunistic hazards. 
DeveJ_0£ment^ £f_0£gjmi_zatjjons 
What are the internal and external factors leading to organizational trans-
formation? Why do we observe continuous adaptations or organizational forms in 
the real world? As argued above, agency research does not fully address these 
questions as a consequence of its comparative-static approach. In this approach 
it is possible to compare one organizational form with another at the same 
point in time (see, e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983b). This comparative analysis 
may yield insights as to the factors explaining differences across organizations. 
It is, however, not suited for an examination of organizational development over 
time. Indeed, no work of this nature exists in the agency literature, as far as 
I know. The analytical work has been mostly confined to one-period models. Even 
in multiperiod formulations the objective is to determine a contract covering all 
periods, not to allow for contractual adaptations. Similarly, in the "positive" 
branch of agency theory sotne disciplining mechanisms are conceptualized to operate 
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in a multiperiod fashion (e.g., the managerial labor market) but only their 
effect on current managerial behavior is examined. It seems, therefore, fair 
to say that the comparative-static approach of agency research inhibits explor-
ation of these dynamic issues. 
The OFF, on the other hand, can accomodate such dynamic issues in its 
comparative-institutional approach. It attempts to identify not only what 
factors wil! cause autonomous contracting to give way to organization but also 
why one organizational form succumbs to another. The prominent explanation here 
is the transformation of a large numbers to smal! numbers situation leading to 
increased asset specificity, "idiosyncratic exchange", and - at the limit -
bilateral monopoly bargaining. This general analysis has been applied to such 
specific probiems as vertical integration, multidivisionalization and multinational-
ization (Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 1981a). Scrutiny of these specific appli-
cations reveals that the general factors identified above are mostly not suf-
ficiënt to explain the examined phenomenon entirely. In most cases additional 
factors are identified and used in a rather ad-hoc fashion. ' Nevertheless, the 
conceptual formulation of the OFF permits such analyses and may shed additional 
light on organizational transformations. It is this potential contribution which 
concerns us here. 
Or£a£iz_a^i£n£l_functiomjig 
Both research programs pertain to organizational functioning at a partic-
ular point in time. It may, therefore, be most instructive to compare them with 
one another as they relate to organizational functioning. Analytical agency 
research, then, remains closest to economics. It broadens traditional economie 
analysis by including the informational variable which had been largely neglected 
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beforehand. One of the assumptions of the model of perfect competition is 
the existence of perfect information to all market parties concerned. The 
notion of perfect information implies that the informational requirements of the 
necessary marginal calculations are fully met, that the information is reliable 
and that it is costlessly available. When market imperfections have been 
analyzed, the assumption of perfect information has seldomly been relaxed. 
Information is usually assumed to be sufficiënt, costless and evenly distributed. 
Analytical agency research, on the other hand, turns information into the center-
piece of the analysis. It inquires into the consequences of insufficiënt, costiy 
and/or asymmetrical information. As such, it introduces an additional variable 
into the economie analysis. It recognizes that economie actors may sometimes 
find it advantageous to manipulate this variable rather than others. Such be-
havior may still be subsumed under the assumption of rational self-interest 
seeking; only the means available to the actors have increased. As noted above, 
such informational problems may occur within organizations as well as across 
markets. Analytical agency research hardly discriminates between the two, al-
though the information settings may be expected to differ rather widely. In-
stead it focusses on characteristics which may apply in both situations such as 
the risk attitude of the principal and the agent, and the observability of 
effort, outcomes, etc. It is assumed that these characteristics have the great-
est explanatory power. Whether this is the case in organizational settings, and 
what modifying effects may emanate, e.g., from the existence of organizational 
norms and information systems, remains an empirical question which as yet has 
hardly been addressed. 
"Positive" agency research occupies an intermediate position. It is 
empirically richer than the "principal-agent"-literature. It also includes 
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disciplining mechanisms which do exist within organizations but not in market 
settings. Organizational functioning is viewed deterministically. The combined 
effects of the various disciplining mechanisms severely constrain organizational 
choice. Managerial discretion is restricted by various markets, such as the 
market for corporate control, the interna! and external labor markets for managers, 
and also the (derivative) "market for information". The operation of these • 
markets counters the adverse effects of the separation of ownership from control 
in the firm. In this respect the positive agency research remains close to 
economics. The number of markets considered has increased, but their (combined) 
effect on organizational functioning has remained the same. Whether the ad-
ditional mechanisms function in the manner hypothesized, again is an empirical 
question which has largely remained unexplored. 
The OFF, finally, combines elements of economics and organizational theory 
and thus represents the most comprehensive bridge betwéen the two. Especially 
its emphasis on bounded rationality (and uncertainty) fits closely with a tradition 
established in organizational theory by Barnard (1938) and Simon (1947) and 
developed further in March and Simon (1958) as wel! as Cyert and March (1963). 
In this respect it builds upon the connection between this tradition and the 
managerial models of the firm in economics (see section 2). It adds a number 
of elements developed in economie theory, especially (a) the informational 
problems discussed above, (b) the concept of economizing on transaction costs 
and (e) the analysis of smal! numbers trading situations. The combination 
enables a fresh analysis of a number of traditional problems in organizational 
functioning such as the employment relation (Williamson, et al., 1975) and or-
ganizational control (Ouchi, 1979 and 1980). The OFF therefore seems partic-
ularly suited to throw an economie light upon problems of organizational 
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functioning. It extends a familiar conceptualization of these problems with 
economie elements rather than reformulating the problems from a purely economie 
perspective and in the process introducing concepts which are alien to organ-
izational theory and not easily to be integrated with it. 
A l.uI™Ë.ry_ 
In summary it wil! be elear that the OFF exhibits the closest conceptual 
relationships with the threefold task of organizational theory. In comparison 
with agency research, it is both broader (pertaining, as it does, to all three 
areas discussed above) and conceptually more integrated with organizational 
theory (employing some of the same concepts). It is, therefore, not surprising 
that its potential contributions have already begun to be explored in the or-
ganizational literature (see, especially, Van de Ven and Joyce, 1981; and 
Williamson, 1981b) whereas the agency research has not yet had much impact on 
this literature. In comparison, agency research may lend itself more easily to 
transferring organizational insights to the economie literature. As discussed 
above, its conceptual structure and mode of analysis remain closest to the 
economics tradition. And the "positive" research explores a number of mechanisms 
which have remained outside the scope of traditional economie analysis. Although 
it is quite possible that economics stands to gain by the incorporation of or-
ganizational insights, the purpose of this essay was to assess the potential 
contribution of recent economie research programs to organization theory. 
From this perspective the OFF certainly seems most promising. 
6-3 Two concluding observations 
In conclusion, two remarks wil! be made which are not specifically related 
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to the purpose of this essay, but which may serve a useful role in the overall 
evaluation of both literatures: 
a. First of all, it must be noted that both literatures harbor some concepts 
which are insufficiently defined. For the agency literature the main 
example is the notion of "unwritten" or "implicft" contracts. Jensen 
(1983, p. 326), for example, defines "an organization as a legal entity 
that serves as a nexus for a complex set of contracts (written and un-
written) among disparate individuals." The concept of an "unwritten con-
tract" remains undefined. Moreover, it would seem to defy operationali-
zation. Retaining the concept in this form would entail the danger of 
rendering the theory completely tautological: all phenomena not to be 
expiained by explicit contracts wil! conveniently be assumed to be governed 
by implicit contracts. ' 
The two prime examples of inadequately defined terms in the OFF are 
"opportunism" and "transaction costs." Opportunism is introduced as allow-
ing for strategie behavior and for self-interest seeking with guile. The 
term apparently covers "moral hazard" and "adverse selection" phenomena 
but is intended to be broader. Exactly what other behaviors are included, 
however, remains unclear. Similarly, the term "transaction costs" which 
figures so prominently in the OFF initially remained undefined, as Perrow 
(1981) has pointed out. In response, Williamson and Ouchi (1981b) offered 
the general characterization of transaction costs as "the costs of running 
the economie system." The term is intended to focus attention on "alter-
native means of contracting" and on "the frictions" that wil! impede or 
block the formation of either markets or hierarchies. Such general 
descriptions invite the same dangers of tautology which were alluded to 
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above. Again, a major task in the further elaboration of this research 
program is the more precise specification of these key concepts. 
b. The agency literature displays a peculiar imbalance in that "the principal's 
problem" (cf. Ross, 1973) is arduously investigated,, whereas the agent's 
problem remains virtually unexplored. In principle, however, the infor-
mational problems may be just as severe for the agent as for the principal. 
The principal may also have private information which is costly or impossible 
to obtain for the agent and which may be strategically used by the prin-
cipal ex ante or ex post. It would, therefore, seem preferable to formuiate 
the analytical framework in a more general fashion and to allow both uni-
lateral and bilateral information asymmetrics. 
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Notes 
Galbraith's (1981, p. 518) "... metaphor was of a man obsessed by sex who 
devotes his life to enhancing the sexual opportunitiesof other people whom 
he has not met." 
For example, some of those accepting Berle and Means' thesis have sought 
for a new concept of the "social responsibility" of corporations to broaden 
its traditional "economie responsibility." I shall not deal with that 
literature here; I have attempted to do so elsewhere (Schreuder, 1981; 
Schreuder and Ramanathan, 1983). 
This seems the most important implication of Kuhn's (1970) concept of a 
research paradigm. It has been applied to organizational theory by Morgan 
(1980) and to accounting by Davis et. al. (1982), while Bourn, et. al. 
(1983) employ the concept of "myths" to explore this idea. 
McManus (1975) and Barzel (1983) have called attention to the fact that 
Frank Knight already recognized the importance of "moral hazard" for ex-
plaining organizational forms. He discusses the concept extensively in 
Chapter 8 of his Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921). In proceeding from 
the discussion of risk in Chapter 8 to that of the entrepreneur and the 
firm in the following chapters, the problem of moral hazard is abandoned 
without explanation. As a consequence, Knight is usually credited with a 
"risk-theory" of the firm and the entrepreneur instead of a more general 
transactions cost theory (Barzel, 1983). 
Information economics expands the analysis to include the selection of an 
optima! information system. Information systems differ in their costs 
and benefits. The latter consist of better expected decision outcomes as 
a result of better signals. In this view, information is regarded as an 
economie commodity and its purchase can be analyzed accordingly. 
See Williamson (1975) and Ouchi (1980) for the conditions leading to the 
infeasibility of different types of contracts. 
Ouchi (1980) has devoted much attention to norms of "reciprocity", 
"legitimate authority" and "common values and beliefs" in interpreting the 
OFF-framework. These norms seem to be subsumed under Williamson's general 
heading of "atmosphere", a relationship Ouchi does not discuss. 
At least if one accepts that both economics and organization theory belong 
to the empirical sciences (whether applied or not). 
To be sure, some authors acknowledge the existence of transactions costs 
as the differentiating variable (e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983b). However, 
this is generally noted in passing and the analysis subsequently focusses 
on the "agency costs" associated with different organizational forms. 
Hence, there is an omission to explain when market contracting wil! give 
way to organization. 
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Cf. the externaüty argument in the case of forward integration and the 
hierarchical decomposition argument in the case of multidivisionalization 
(Wüliamson, 1981a). The explanation for the growth of conglomerates and 
multinationals I find rather unconvincing, as it hinges mainly upon the 
experience gained by management in multidivisionalization. This explan-
ation seems at odds with the genera! thrust of the OFF which stresses 
efficiency considerations. 
Jensen (1983) stresses the usefulness of tautologies but seems to inad-
equately distinguish these from definitions. The notion of an "implicit 
contract" is especially troublesome since many organizational relations 
would seem to be non-contractual in nature (Macau!ay, 1963; Kaplan, 1983). 
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